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The classic welfare analysis of firm entry involves a trade-off between the ben-efits of competition and losses from rent seeking. The benefits of competi-
tion are straightforward. The rent-seeking losses stem from the fact that part of an 
entrant’s profit is generated by stealing business from incumbent firms. These trans-
ferred profits are not a social benefit, but the fixed outlays associated with entry 
represent a social cost. Under these conditions, N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D. 
Whinston (1986) show that excessive entry is likely. This standard model, however, 
does not address a key feature of many industries—the inelastic supply of certain 
factors of production, such as labor or land. We consider the impact of such con-
strained inputs on the welfare economics of entry by studying hospital entry into the 
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may lead to an inefficiently high number of firms in equilibrium. 
Under input scarcity, however, the welfare loss from free entry is 
reduced. Further, free entry may increase use of high-quality inputs, 
as oligopolistic firms underuse these inputs when entry is con-
strained. We assess these predictions by examining how the 1996 
repeal of certificate-of-need (CON ) legislation in Pennsylvania 
affected the market for cardiac surgery in the state. We show that 
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provision of coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. CABG represents a natu-
ral case study for two reasons. The supply of cardiac surgeons is roughly fixed in the 
short term and the quality of output is at least partially measurable.
With imperfectly supplied inputs, entry is less likely to be excessive than when 
inputs are more elastically supplied. A more subtle implication of constrained inputs 
relates to the level of quality at which firms will enter. In our setting, a surgeon may 
be a leader in the field or a novice, and when a hospital decides to enter the CABG 
market, it must decide which surgeons to employ. More generally, the decision about 
quality depends on the supply elasticity of factor inputs. Entry is likely to occur at 
high quality if high-quality labor is in relatively inelastic supply. In such a setting, 
oligopsonistic firms will ration use of high-quality workers prior to free entry, and 
new entrants will find such workers valuable. In contrast, entry will occur at lower 
quality if the supply of high-quality labor is relatively elastic.
To examine these implications empirically, we consider CABG entry by hospitals 
in Pennsylvania, which in 1996 eliminated its certificate of need (CON) policy that 
restricted entry by hospitals into expensive clinical programs, such as CABG.1 Repeal 
of CON was associated with significant hospital entry into CABG—from 1996 to 
2003 the number of hospitals providing this service in Pennsylvania increased from 
43-63.2 We rely on this growth to estimate the welfare effects of entry in this market.
The overall volume of CABG in Pennsylvania remained roughly flat for several 
years after CON repeal. We find that, as new programs entered the market, volume 
shifted from incumbent programs to entrants and from lower- to higher-quality sur-
geons. The repeal of CON in Pennsylvania thus appears to have had a salutary effect 
on the market for cardiac surgery by directing more volume to better doctors and 
increasing access to treatment. Offsetting this benefit are the fixed costs paid by 
new entrants of about $13 million per program. On its own, the benefit of reduced 
mortality from the increased use of high-quality surgeons roughly offsets the fixed 
costs associated with free entry. Given our conservative assumptions and the fact 
that these estimates do not capture other gains from the repeal of CON (e.g., reduc-
tions in morbidity due to the reallocation of patients or reductions in administrative 
costs), our results suggest entry due to the repeal of CON was approximately welfare 
neutral.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section I discusses entry decisions in the pres-
ence of fixed factors of production. Section II describes the cardiac surgery setting. 
Section III presents our results concerning the impact of repealing CON. Section IV 
estimates the welfare implications of this repeal. Section V concludes.
1 CON regulation has been studied in some detail (see Christopher J. Conover and Frank A. Sloan 1998). The 
primary focus of this literature, however, has been on the cost implications of restricted entry. A smaller number 
of recent papers in both the health economics and medical literatures examine the impact of CON regulation on 
clinical quality (e.g., Vivian Ho 2006; Verdi J. DiSesa et al. 2006; Robert H. Jones 2006), as we do in this study.
2 Our data include an additional hospital that entered the market in late 2003 performing a total of 31 surger-
ies by the end of 2003. Because entry occurred well after the repeal of CON, and we observe only a very small 
number of procedures from that hospital in our data, we exclude this facility from the remaining analysis. 
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I.  Firm Entry in Markets with Constrained Inputs
In general, firm entry into a market increases welfare by lowering prices (and 
thereby increasing volume) or increasing product variety (Avinash K. Dixit and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz 1977; A. Michael Spence 1976; Roger W. Koenker and Martin 
K. Perry 1981; Mankiw and Whinston 1986). These gains, however, come at the 
social cost of redundant fixed investments in setting up additional firms (Mankiw 
and Whinston 1986). In the standard model, a trade-off exists between the benefits 
of competition and the losses from additional costs of entry.
In health care, where demand is uncertain and insured consumers tend not to face 
full prices, entry can have additional welfare costs. These losses come from people 
getting too many or too few services or changes in quality that cannot be observed 
due to asymmetric information (Kenneth J. Arrow 1963; Martin Gaynor 2006; Mark 
V. Pauly 2004).3 We begin by examining the more standard effect of competition 
and return to moral hazard below.
The nature of competition in the input market affects the welfare costs of entry, 
and we explore these effects when input supply is not perfectly elastic. We adopt a 
simple model of monopolistic competition in the input market. We refer to a “wage” 
for a surgeon, but note that compensation is more likely set by a bargain in which the 
hospital and surgeon agree to an appropriation of the rents from performing surgery. 
In the monopolistically competitive input market, supply elasticity effectively cap-
tures the market power relative to hospitals.4 Relying on this framework allows us 
to capture the basic predictions of a Nash bargaining solution while also considering 
the welfare impact of entry in the same model employed by Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986).
The first prediction is relatively straightforward. Suppose that surgeons are a 
scarce input, available in imperfectly elastic supply. Such input scarcity raises the 
cost of entry, thereby reducing the profits of new firms. The less elastic is labor sup-
ply, the smaller the predicted entry associated with opening up markets.5
Less straightforward is the situation in which inputs vary in quality, and the elas-
ticity of input supply differs by quality. Quality effects are particularly relevant in a 
3 The combination of these factors can lead to firms competing in a “medical arms race” with excess services 
provided to cover fixed entry costs (James C. Robinson and Harold S. Luft 1987).
4 The particular nature of the bargain may alter the explicit predictions of the model. However, to the extent 
that the bargaining framework results in each party being paid a reservation wage, the equilibrium converges to 
the monopolistically competitive outcome. For example, Oliver Hart and Jean Tirole (1990) show that, under a 
reasonable set of assumptions, the Nash bargaining solution between upstream and downstream firms results in 
Cournot prices and quantities in the output market (even if the upstream party is a monopolist). This situation also 
resembles our setting in that the markup due to market power is declining in the number of downstream firms 
(Patrick Rey and Tirole 2007). 
5 In monopolistic competition, where firms maximize profit subject to demand and input elasticities, the con-
dition for the equilibrium number of firms is related to the familiar Lerner equation:
L =  P − MC _______
P  = αN Q−  1 __ ηq +  1 __ ηL R ,
where αN is a measure of per firm market share, ηq is the elasticity of demand, and ηL is the labor supply elasticity. 
The term 1/ηL captures the decrease in the markup resulting from higher factor costs with inelastic labor supply. 
Because αN is declining in N by definition, the inclusion of 1/ηL causes ∂L/∂N to be larger in magnitude (i.e., 
more negative). That is, the markup dissipates faster with entry when inputs are not perfectly supplied.
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setting such as health care, where the technical skill of labor is important.6 A firm 
seeking to produce at a given level of quality must hire labor with the requisite skills. 
The cost of achieving a given level of output quality is thus determined by the rela-
tive scarcity of the inputs required to produce at that level of quality
A variety of considerations suggest that high-quality surgeons will have less elas-
tic labor supply than standard-quality surgeons. Surgery is a skill that takes time to 
produce. Thus, training of high-quality surgeons cannot occur very rapidly. Further, 
by definition, superstar surgeons represent a small portion of the total number of 
surgeons needed to serve a given market.
The negotiation that determines the allocation of rents between surgeons and hos-
pitals depends, on one side, on the relative strength of a hospital’s threat to substitute 
between surgeons at a given level of quality and, on the other side, on the counter-
vailing threat of a surgeon transferring volume to a different hospital. In this way, 
the impact of changes in the number of hospitals on equilibrium quantities and wage 
offers will differ for high-quality and standard-quality surgeons.7
To see this more precisely, consider the equilibrium quality and quantity choices 
made by hospitals when entry is prohibited. If hospitals act as oligopsonists in the 
input market, they will demand standard-quality (i.e., “acceptable”) surgeons more 
than high-quality surgeons. The reason is that the supply of high-quality surgeons is 
less elastic, causing hospital profits to dissipate more rapidly by employing them. In 
the limit with only one high-quality surgeon, that surgeon would earn all of the rents 
associated with his or her superior quality.
The entry of new firms reduces the ability of any one firm to influence the input 
market by withholding capacity, as each firm accounts for a smaller share of total 
output. In short, entry moves the market from its equilibrium oligopsony quantity 
to a larger near-competitive quantity. This increase in quantity will be larger in 
markets that are further from the competitive equilibrium under restricted entry; 
that is, markets where labor supply is less elastic. To the extent that high-quality 
surgeons supply labor less elastically than standard-quality surgeons, we would 
expect to see a differentially larger increase in the use of high-quality surgeons 
under free entry.
II.  Empirical Setting and Data
A. CABG Surgery
CABG surgery was developed in the late 1960s and entered mainstream use in 
the United States during the 1970s. The procedure involves surgically isolating a 
section of vein (from the leg) or artery (from the chest) and grafting it to create 
6 For example, the average mortality rate for the worst performing 20 percent of bypass surgeons in our sample 
in 1994–1995 was 2.5 times that of the top 20 percent.
7 John Sutton (1991) argues that firms can make investments that limit the degree of subsequent entry. His 
theory of endogenous sunk costs focuses primarily on investments, such as those in research and development 
(R&D) or brands, that are difficult for new entrants to replicate. To the extent that our model hinges on firms 
capturing a scarce input (i.e., high-quality labor) as a limiting factor in subsequent entry, it can be seen as an 
application of Sutton’s model. Specifically, one may consider the recruitment of high-quality labor to be akin to 
R&D aimed at improving the quality of a firm’s product.
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a bypass of blockage in the coronary artery. In a traditional CABG, the patient is 
placed on a heart-lung bypass machine, which performs the functions of the heart 
during the grafting process. Following the procedure, the patient remains in the hos-
pital for several days to allow caregivers to monitor the recovery process.
The use of CABG grew substantially during the technology’s first three decades. 
Among the United States population age 50 or above, the number of CABG proce-
dures grew from a nationwide total of 15,000 in 1971 to a peak of 552,000 in 1997, 
before falling to 424,000 by 2003 (National Center for Health Statistics 2006). This 
decline in CABG has been attributed to increased competition from less invasive 
treatments, such as percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) (Cutler 
and Huckman 2003). PTCA is a less intensive way of fixing coronary occlusions, 
but failure during the procedure can require emergency CABG surgery. As a result, 
many states, including Pennsylvania, require the presence of CABG back-up for the 
performance of PTCA.8 Because PTCA is less intensive but still well reimbursed, its 
use spread in the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, some of the hospitals in our sample 
may have entered the CABG market with the primary aim of providing CABG itself, 
while others may have done so with the primary aim of developing a strong PTCA 
program. We exploit this difference in entry motives as a robustness check later in 
our analysis.
CABG is an expensive procedure to provide, and the fixed costs of setting up 
a CABG facility are significant. Huckman (2006) finds the average fixed cost to 
establish a CABG program in New York State to be $14 million. Further, Jamie L. 
Robinson et al. (2001) present reported setup costs of $13.4 and $12 million for two 
programs entering the Pennsylvania market in 2000. To put such an investment in 
perspective, we note that the average net income between 1996 and 2005 for hospi-
tals entering the CABG market in Pennsylvania was $3.5 million.9 In addition, the 
ongoing costs of a CABG program are significant, as hospitals offering the procedure 
typically employ a staff of nurses, perfusionists, and other technicians dedicated to 
cardiac surgery.
Despite its high cost, CABG is very profitable for hospitals. Roughly half of 
CABG patients are covered by Medicare, which pays relatively generously. Most of 
the remainder is privately insured. Further, a large number of people have coronary 
artery disease, so resources rarely sit idle. It is generally believed that, along with 
orthopedics and oncology, cardiac care accounts for the bulk of many hospitals’ 
profit. Thus, the impact of CON regulation on CABG surgery has important implica-
tions for overall hospital profitability.
B. The Hospital-Surgeon Relationship
Our model assumes that firms choose the quality of the employees they hire. 
With few exceptions, however, hospitals tend not to employ surgeons. Rather, they 
8 In certain “low-risk” cases, PTCA may be conducted at a Pennsylvania hospital without CABG backup. 
Nevertheless, the majority of PTCA cases occurring during our sample period would have required the presence 
of CABG at the hospital.
9 Authors calculation using data from the Medicare Cost Reports 1996–2005.
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provide them with surgical privileges and access to facilities, such as operating 
rooms. Still a hospital may provide a surgeon with various nonpecuniary benefits 
that may influence the degree to which the surgeon performs procedures at that 
facility. For example, one way for a hospital to lure a physician is through pre-
ferred scheduling. The physician might be promised his or her choice of operating 
rooms and a dedicated time to use the room. The quantity and composition of the 
surgeon’s clinical support staff, such as nurses and anesthesiologists, represents 
another means by which hospitals may attract surgeons. In addition, there may be 
intangible benefits such as preferred access to parking, office space, and admin-
istrative support. Effectively, the hospital and physician enter an at-least-implicit 
contract that specifies how the joint benefits of surgery are to be split, without any 
direct money changing hands between the two parties. As such, we think of this 
relationship as akin to employment, even without a direct monetary transaction. 
In this case, the “wage” paid by the hospital is reflected in the value of the various 
benefits conveyed to the surgeon.
C. CABG and CON Regulation in Pennsylvania
With encouragement from the federal government, individual states instituted 
CON regulations for hospitals during the 1970s. These regulations required state 
approval before hospitals could invest in costly technologies, such as cardiac sur-
gery. CON was instituted as a reaction to concerns that competition between hospi-
tals would lead to a “medical arms race” (Robinson and Luft 1985) characterized 
by excessive service provision and increased cost. During the 1980s, a push toward 
deregulation reduced federal funding for CON programs, and states responded by 
dismantling or scaling back these regulations. On December 18, 1996, Pennsylvania 
repealed its CON law, effectively allowing free entry into a broad range of hospital 
services, including cardiac surgery.
At the time Pennsylvania repealed its CON law, 43 hospitals were licensed to 
provide CABG surgery in the state. This figure represented 16 percent of all acute-
care hospitals in the state and 33 percent of all acute-care hospitals with 200 or 
more beds—the threshold hospital size that is often assumed necessary to support 
a bypass program. Following the repeal of CON, entry into CABG was swift, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Four programs entered in each of the years 1997 and 1998, 
and there were 23 total entrants by 2003. In 2000, post-CON entrants accounted for 
10 percent of Pennsylvania’s total CABG volume. This figure grew to 20 percent 
by 2003. All together, there was a 46 percent net increase in the number of CABG 
programs in the state between 1996 and 2003.10
To determine how much of the above growth was due to the repeal of CON, 
Figure 2 presents the total number of CABG programs in Pennsylvania, New York, 
and New Jersey for the period from 1995 to 2003. Because New York and New 
Jersey maintained CON regulation throughout the study period, we use them as 
controls for the rate of growth in new CABG programs that would have occurred 
10 Between 1996 and 2003, three existing CABG programs exited the Pennsylvania market.
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between 1995 and 2003 under regulated entry. Based on these controls, the repeal 
of CON led to the entry of between 10 and 16 of the 23 new CABG programs in 
Pennsylvania.11
11 We return to this estimate later when computing the welfare impact of the repeal of CON in Pennsylvania. 
We bound the cost in the welfare calculations between the fixed cost associated with the 20 new entrants ( without 
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A majority of hospitals that entered the CABG market after the repeal of CON 
were in the suburbs of major cities. Figure 3 plots incumbent and entrant programs 
on a map of Pennsylvania. Thirteen of the 23 entrants were in the suburbs of either 
Philadelphia or Pittsburgh. The remaining new programs were distributed through-
out the state but tended to be located in medium-sized cities where an incumbent 
program had a virtual monopoly on CABG surgery prior to the repeal of CON. 
For example, both Johnstown and Altoona had one incumbent program each before 
1996, and each faced one entrant following CON repeal. The Wilkes-Barre and 
Scranton areas moved from two incumbent programs, one in each town, to a total 
of five programs. Some areas of the state, particularly the less densely populated 
northern interior, had few or no new programs.
Table 1 presents information on the size of new programs. On average, entrant pro-
grams are smaller than incumbents in terms of both total procedures and procedures 
per surgeon (e.g., 160 procedures per year over the 2000–2003 period compared to 
349 for incumbent programs). The relatively low volumes at entrant programs are 
not surprising given the time required for a new program to reach an “equilibrium” 
level of volume. For example, the three hospitals that entered the market in 1997 
averaged 174 total surgeries in their first year of operation. By 2003, however, those 
same programs performed an average of 305 surgeries (relative to the 2003 average 
of 296 procedures per incumbent program) despite a decline in the statewide CABG 
volume between 1997 and 2003.
controlling for New Jersey and New York) and the lower bound of 10 new entrants attributable to the policy 
change including controls from nearby states.
Incumbent Program
New Entrant Program
Market Boundary (HRR) 
– - – - – - – - –
0                   35                   70                                   140 Miles 
Figure 3. Map of Incumbent and Entrant CABG Hospitals in Pennsylvania
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Many new programs aimed to establish themselves by contracting with surgeons 
who were already licensed in Pennsylvania and practicing at incumbent hospitals. 
Of the 225 surgeons performing at least one CABG procedure in Pennsylvania in 
the years 2000–2003,12 122 split their time across hospitals. Over half of the sur-
geons performing CABG surgery at entrant hospitals during the 2000–2003 period 
worked at a different institution under CON. The remainder were new to the market.
Despite the entry of new surgeons, the net supply of surgeons did not change 
much during the study period. Between 1994 and 2004, there was a net increase of 
only 10 physicians, or 5 percent,13 despite the addition of many new programs.
D. Data
The primary source of data for our analysis is the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council (PHC4), which has collected patient-level records for every 
individual receiving CABG at a hospital in Pennsylvania in 1994, 1995, 2000, 2002, 
and 2003.14 These data cover 89,406 procedures performed by 303 physicians at 67 
hospitals. The PHC4 data identifies the surgeon and hospital associated with each 
procedure. In addition, it provides a wide range of patient-level covariates, such as 
age, gender, and several clinical measures of illness severity.
For some descriptive analyses, we use another PHC4 database that reports the 
total number of CABG patients over the entire period from 1993 to 2003. These 
data, however, are from standard discharge abstracts and, as such, do not include the 
same patient-level clinical information that is found in the first database described 
above. In addition, these latter data do not have the validated surgeon identifiers 
that are present in the former dataset. Finally, we use data from the Medicare Cost 
12 This figure excludes surgeons who performed surgeries only in 2001, as Pennsylvania did not make data on 
CABG procedures available for that year.
13 Entry and exit are defined by the year of licensure in the state of Pennsylvania. Exit year is determined by 
the last available year that a surgeon was licensed to practice if a license was not renewed. Entry is the first year 
a surgeon was licensed to practice in the state.
14 These data are not available for the years 1996–1999 and 2001.
Table 1—Description of Incumbent and Entrant CABG Programs in Pennsylvania
Number of 
programs
Annual
CABGs
Total 
surgeons*
Average 
surgeons per 
program
Average
annual
CABGs per 
surgeon**
Average 
hospital 
RAMR
(percent)
Incumbent programs
 1994–1995 43 451 203 4.72 95 3.10
 2000, 2002–2003 40 349 201 5.03 96 2.17
Entrant programs
 2000, 2002–2003 23 160 115 4.79 87 2.04
 * Figures include all individuals practicing at a given program type and, thus, may count a surgeon twice if he or 
she splits time across incumbent and entrant programs.
** Average total number of procedures across all hospitals by surgeons practicing at incumbent and entrant hos-
pitals in each period.
Source: PHC4 CABG Database.
60 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: ECONOMIC POLICy FEBRUARy 2010
Reports from 1993 to 2003 to examine the profitability of various categories of 
Pennsylvania hospitals around the the time of the repeal of CON.
E. Measuring Provider Quality
We distinguish high-quality from standard-quality surgeons using data on the 
risk-adjusted, in-hospital mortality of their CABG patients. To adjust binary mortal-
ity outcomes for patient severity, we estimate the following logistic regression:
(1)  ln a​ morti,s,h _________  
1 − morti,s,hb​= α0 + α1 Xi + εi,s,h,
where i indexes patients, s indexes surgeons, and h indexes hospitals. The indicator 
morti,s,h, equals one if patient i died in the hospital and zero otherwise. Xi is a matrix 
of covariates that includes controls for several patient characteristics and existing 
clinical conditions that could affect a patient’s underlying probability of dying in the 
hospital.15 We calculate the risk-adjusted mortality rate (RAMRs,h ) for each surgeon-
hospital pair as
(2)   RAMRs,h = (OMRs,h/EMRs,h)OMRPA,
where OMRs,h is the observed mortality rate for surgeon s at hospital h, and EMRs,h 
is the expected mortality rate—the average predicted probability of mortality from 
(1)—for the same surgeon-hospital pair. The final term, OMRPA, is the average 
observed mortality rate for the entire state over the sample period. This multiplica-
tion normalizes risk-adjusted mortality to the statewide average.
III.  Results
We report our results in four parts. First, we look at the impact of entry on the 
volume of cases and profit for entrant and incumbent hospitals. Second, we consider 
how market share shifts among surgeons of different quality levels following entry. 
Third, we examine whether these changes in volume have spillover effects (positive 
or negative) due to scale effects at the level of the hospital or surgeon. Finally, we 
look at the impact of entry on the distances patients travel for care.
A. Changes in Quantity and Profit
Standard models predict that free entry will lower prices and raise volume, thereby 
increasing consumer surplus. In health care, however, the situation is somewhat 
more complex. Because consumers often are not well informed about their needs 
for particular services and are insured for much of the cost, it is not  obvious that 
15 Examples of the variables included in Xi are patient age, gender, complicated hypertension, heart failure, 
heart attack, kidney failure, and cardiogenic shock. A full list of the covariates included in this regression, as well 
as the resulting coefficient estimates, can be found in various PHC4 publications. For instance, the covariates and 
results for the 1994 and 1995 data can be found in Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (1998).
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increased quantities of care are welfare enhancing. Indeed, many models of health 
care predict overconsumption in equilibrium (Arrow 1963; Joseph P. Newhouse 
1970; Richard Zeckhauser 1970), with greater service provision potentially reduc-
ing welfare.16 Determining the welfare impact of entry-related changes in volume 
requires empirical analysis.
Figure 4 shows per capita CABG volume in Pennsylvania between 1990 and 2003, 
as well as similar figures for New York and New Jersey, nearby states where CON 
regulation remained in place throughout the sample period. Though Pennsylvania 
provides significantly more CABG procedures per capita than either of the two con-
trol states, this relative difference does not change following the repeal of CON. 
In all three states, volume per capita increases in the early to mid-1990s and then 
declines, consistent with the national trend. Regression analysis confirms the impres-
sion from the figure. Relating CABG volume to a post-1996 indicator, state indicator 
variables, and a post-1996 Pennsylvania-specific indicator yields a coefficient on the 
differential impact in Pennsylvania after 1996 of −417 (standard error = 2,234).17 
In addition to being statistically insignificant, the estimated value of this coefficient 
is actually negative suggesting, if anything, a slightly greater decline in total CABG 
volume following the repeal of CON.
In addition to analyzing the effect of entry across states, we use variation in the 
timing and extent of entry across markets within Pennsylvania to estimate the effect 
of entry on the volume of CABG procedures at incumbent hospitals. We define mar-
kets using the hospital referral regions (HRRs) developed by John E. Wennberg et al. 
(1999)—groups of zip codes in which residents travel to roughly the same hospitals 
16 In fact, this argument is commonly offered as a reason for the institution of CON regulation.
17 Our results are similar when the denominator of the CABG rate is limited to population age 45 and older.
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Figure 4. Per Capita CABG Utilization in Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey
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for acute care.18 Wennberg et al. (1999) group Pennsylvania into 15 HRRs. We form 
semi-annual CABG volumes for incumbent and entrant hospitals and estimate lon-
gitudinal models for incumbent volume as a function of market fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and entrant volume in the preceding six months. The results suggest 
that each additional surgery at an entrant program is associated with a reduction of 
1.72 (standard error = 0.14) surgeries at incumbent hospitals in the same HRR. This 
coefficient is significantly different not only from zero but also from one, suggesting 
that incumbent hospitals may substitute angioplasty for CABG in markets where 
entry is more prevalent. Taken together, the evidence both across states and within 
Pennsylvania suggests no increase in overall CABG utilization in conjunction with 
free entry.19
The complement to volume is price. Our data do not include information on prices 
paid to hospitals, as negotiated rates are proprietary. Nevertheless, some things are 
known. Fifty-four percent of the procedures in our data are performed on patients 
covered by Medicare. As a result of Medicare’s administered pricing system—with 
reimbursement depending on the diagnosis of the patient, the teaching status of the 
hospital, local wage rates, and the level of low-income patients the hospital serves—
Medicare prices are not a direct choice variable for a hospital. Further, prices for 
patients with private insurance tend to vary with Medicare rates, making most hos-
pitals price-takers, at least in the short term.20
With no change in overall quantity, but a shift of volume to new entrants, the short-
run allocation of profits moves away from incumbent hospitals and toward entrants. 
Ordinarily, shifting profits is not a policy concern, as all profits count equally in 
social welfare calculations. This assumption may not be true in health care, however, 
where private firms provide varying levels of public goods. Most hospitals, at least 
not-for-profit hospitals, have an explicit goal of subsidizing less profitable care with 
the returns from treating more profitable patients. If incumbent CABG providers 
accounted for a disproportionately large share of the provision of public goods, free 
entry could result in welfare losses from the redistribution of rents.
A common measure of less remunerative care is the share of uninsured people 
seen at a given hospital. Unfortunately, we are not able to obtain this information 
for the institutions in our sample. Nevertheless, the level of Medicaid patients at 
a hospital is likely to be correlated with its level of uninsured patients. Thus, we 
examine how incumbent and entrant hospitals compare in terms of Medicaid admis-
sions. We find that incumbent CABG hospitals have a larger proportion of Medicaid 
patients (across all diagnoses) than eventual CABG entrants. In 1994–1995, 15 per-
cent of admissions at incumbent hospitals were insured by Medicaid, compared to 
18 Specifically, the areas are defined by the hospitals visited for cardiac care by 80 percent of Medicare ben-
eficiaries in that zip code (Wennberg et al. 1999). 
19 These results are consistent with Steven T. Berry and Joel Waldfogel’s (1999) study of free entry in radio 
broadcasting in which roughly 80 percent of new entry leads to the transfer of customers between firms without 
expanding demand.
20 Chernew, Gautam Gowrisankaran, and A. Mark Fendrick (2002) find evidence of variation in the profit-
ability of CABG surgery across payer types. They also find that competition reduces the profitability of CABG 
performed on managed care patients. We cannot investigate these effects directly without price data. We note, 
however, that our hospital-level profit analysis (below) addresses the welfare impact of changes in prices and payer 
mix to the extent they affect overall hospital profit.
VOL. 2 NO. 1 63CUTLER ET AL.: INPUT CONSTRAINTS AND THE EFFICIENCy OF ENTRy
10  percent at eventual CABG entrants ( p-value for difference < 0.01) and 16 percent 
for those hospitals that never introduced CABG ( p-value for difference = 0.54).
Of course, hospital operations are not static, and these firms can react to a loss 
of profitable volume in many ways. For example, salaries might be lowered or ser-
vices cut. To examine the impact of CON repeal on overall profitability, we consider 
the long-run impact of entry on profits. Hospitals are required to file cost reports 
with Medicare that list net patient revenues and operating expenses, from which we 
derive operating margins (i.e., operating income divided by net patient revenues).
We present data on trends in hospital profits, but note an obvious caveat. CABG 
is but one service offered by these hospitals, and overall profitability depends on the 
total portfolio of services provided by an institution. Still, the fact that cardiac care 
is a large part of hospital profits speaks to the relevance of this analysis.
Figure 5 presents the time series of operating margins for incumbent and entrant 
hospitals, as well as other Pennsylvania hospitals that never entered the CABG mar-
ket. All hospitals that eventually developed a cardiac program, either incumbents or 
entrants, are more profitable than those that never entered the market. Margins for 
incumbent hospitals were negative in much of the late 1990s—the period immedi-
ately following CON repeal. However, these institutions regained profitability by 
2002 and were, in fact, the most profitable hospitals by the end of the observation 
period.21 The specific steps incumbent hospitals took to regain profitability cannot 
be observed in our data, but the results suggest that, overall, these hospitals were not 
put in a precarious position by the elimination of CON.
21 To examine the significance of these changes, we ran a regression of operating margin for incumbent hos-
pitals against the share of new entrants in the incumbent’s hospitals HRR, a time trend, and hospital fixed effects. 
We found no significant effect of entry. The coefficient on entry share is negative but insignificant. The same was 
true for the profitability of entrants. 
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B. Changes in Quality from Redistribution of Inputs
Our theoretical discussion posits that free entry may increase the demand for rela-
tively inelastic factors—in this case, high-quality surgeons. To evaluate the direct 
effect of entry on the input decisions of firms, we rely on variation in the level of 
entry across markets (i.e., HRRs) in Pennsylvania following the repeal of CON. We 
estimate the following specification:
(3)  surgshares,j,t = β0 + β1 entrantshare_groupj,t + β2 highquals 
 × entrantshare_groupj,t + β3 newdocs 
 × entrantshare_groupj,t + α t + Is, j + εs, j, t .
We define surgshares, j, t as the share held by surgeon s in market j in quarter t. We 
relate this variable to entrantshare_groupj, t, a vector of indicators for whether the 
share of CABG procedures in market j occurring at entrant hospitals is in the fol-
lowing categories: 1–10 percent, 11–20 percent, or above 20 percent; highquals, an 
indicator for whether surgeon s is a high-quality surgeon;22 and newdocs, an indica-
tor for surgeons who entered the Pennsylvania market after CON repeal and, as a 
result, could not be distinguished by hospitals as being either standard quality or 
high quality in the period before CON repeal. We also interact entrantshare_groupj,t 
with highqual and newdocs. The coefficients on these interactions capture the differ-
ential share changes following entry for high-quality and new surgeons, respectively, 
compared to standard-quality surgeons.
We note that our specification of the entrant share variable enables us to capture 
a potential nonlinear relationship between entry and the demand for particular cat-
egories of surgeons. Our theory suggests such nonlinearity may exist, as the mar-
ginal effect of entry on oligopsony power in the market is declining in the number 
of firms.23
We define highquals in four ways. Our base estimates define highquals as the top 
10 percent of surgeons with at least 50 operations in the CON period (1994–1995). 
All other surgeons who performed at least one procedure in Pennsylvania in 1994–
1995 are considered standard-quality surgeons and represent the excluded category 
in our analysis. In subsequent estimates, we define highquals as the top 20, 30, and 
40 percent of surgeons, respectively, using a similar methodology. As noted above, 
surgeons entering the Pennsylvania market after CON repeal are not eligible for the 
highquals category and instead are included in the newdocs category.
Control variables in (3) include fixed effects for quarter (αt ) and surgeon-market 
pairs (Is,j ). Our theory predicts β2 > 0. When more firms enter a market, the share 
22 We discuss our definitions of high- and standard-quality surgeons later in the manuscript.
23 General models of entry with imperfect competition also predict a nonlinear relationship between entry 
and competition. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Peter C. Reiss (1991) study entry empirically and find most of the 
competitive effect comes from the second and third entrants, with diminishing impact on market conduct beyond 
that level. Jean Marie Abraham, Martin Gaynor, and William B. Vogt (2007) also find a nonlinear effect of entry 
on competition in hospital markets.
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of surgeries performed by high-quality surgeons should rise relative to the share held 
by standard-quality surgeons.
Estimates of β1 are negative and precisely estimated over all ranges of entrant 
share in column 1 of Table 2. The sign of these coefficients suggests that gains 
in share by entrant hospitals are associated with reductions in share for standard-
quality surgeons. As we relax the definition of a high-quality surgeon in columns 2 
and 3, this relationship remains negative and significant for entrant shares between 
1 percent and 10 percent.
Consistent with our predictions, the estimates of the β2 coefficients are positive 
and significant in column 1 for markets with up to 20 percent share held by entrant 
hospitals. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that increasing entrant share 
beyond 0 and up to 10 percent is associated with an increase of 2.6 percentage points 
for the average high-quality surgeon relative to the impact for the average standard-
quality surgeon. For entrants holding between 10 and 20 percent share, this increase 
is 2.1 percentage points greater than the 1.2 percentage point decline for standard-
quality surgeons. The magnitude of these effects is economically significant. The 
average high-quality surgeon (based on the top 10 percent definition) had a market 
share of 4.9 percent between 2000 and 2003. The reallocation associated with entry 
is thus equivalent to a 53 percent increase (relative to the mean) in share for high-
quality surgeons in markets with positive entrant share less than 10 percent and a 
44 percent increase for the same surgeons in markets with entrant share between 
10 and 20 percent. In columns 2 and 3, the coefficient estimates for β2 are positive 
for entrant shares between 1 percent and 10 percent, though the point estimates are 
smaller and significant at only the 10 percent level.
The effect of new entry on reallocation to high-quality surgeons falls off in all 
specifications as entrant market share grows beyond either 10 or 20 percent. This 
tapering suggests entry up to that point may be sufficient to push demand for high-
quality surgeons from its regulated level to the competitive equilibrium. Indeed, 
above these threshold entrant shares, additional share seems to go to surgeons who 
are new to the Pennsylvania market, as shown by the positive and relatively large 
(though statistically insignificant) β3 coefficients for entrant shares above 10 per-
cent. Finally, we note that both the magnitude and significance of the relative share 
increase for high-quality surgeons declines as we move from the most restrictive 
definition of a high-quality surgeon (i.e., top 10 percent in column 1) to the least 
restrictive (i.e., top 40 percent in column 4). This tapering supports our contention 
that the top surgeons are in relatively high demand following entry.
Our analysis to this point has treated all entrants as similar. As noted earlier, 
however, this assumption may not be appropriate, as some hospitals may enter the 
CABG market because they want to do a significant number of CABG surgeries, 
while others may enter primarily as backup for angioplasty (i.e., PTCA) services. 
Hospitals entering the CABG market primarily as backup for PTCA may place less 
of a premium on a high-quality CABG surgeon and, in turn, may be more likely to 
contract with standard-quality surgeons.
As a robustness check, we test for this distinction by measuring the degree to 
which each entrant hospital is “focused” on either CABG or PTCA. Our measure 
of focus is CABG’s share of all revascularization procedures (i.e., CABG plus 
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PTCA) at a hospital after it enters the CABG market. For each entrant, we com-
pare the actual value of this CABG share measure to its predicted value based 
on a regression for all entrants, controlling for calendar time and years since 
entry. Hospitals with higher-than-predicted CABG shares are classified as CABG 
focused while those with lower-than-predicted shares are classified as PTCA 
focused.24
24 Formally, we regress the share of cardiac procedures (i.e., CABG plus PTCA) that were CABGs at hospital h, 
in quarter t, on the number of years since hospital h entered the CABG market and indicators for calendar quarter.
Table 2—Impact of Entrant Share on the Share of CABG Procedures by  
Standard-and High-Quality Surgeons
Dependent variable: surgeon market share
High-quality High-quality High-quality High-quality
surgeon = top 
10 percent
surgeon = top 
20 percent
surgeon = top 
30 percent
surgeon = top 
40 percent
β1: Entrant share group
1–10 percent −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.005
(0.003)** (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004)
11–20 percent −0.012 −0.009 −0.011 −0.006
(0.007)* (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
20+ percent −0.014 −0.008 −0.010 −0.004
(0.008)* (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
β2: Entrant share group × high-quality surgeon
1–10 percent 0.026 0.014 0.013 0.004
(0.010)** (0.008)* (0.007)* (0.007)
11–20 percent 0.021 0.007 0.009 −0.002
(0.010)** (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
20+ percent 0.020 −0.005 0.005 −0.008
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
β3: Entrant share group × new surgeon
1–10 percent 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
11–20 percent 0.018 0.015 0.016 0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
20+ percent 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Year = 2002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year = 2003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836
R2 0.8961 0.8961 0.8958 0.8958
Notes: Includes observations only for the years following the repeal of CON in Pennsylvania (i.e., 2000, 2002, 
and 2003). All models include surgeon-market fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by sur-
geon and market.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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There are two potential concerns with this measure. First, ex post CABG volume 
may be affected by quality after entry. Second, entering hospitals may not reach their 
“equilibrium” focus immediately. We attempt to minimize both concerns by com-
puting a hospital’s CABG share during its second year in the CABG market. This 
timing is long enough to reduce the noise in CABG share due the initial ramp up of 
new programs, but short enough to minimize a program’s ability to adjust volume 
endogenously. Further, even a noisy approximation of CABG focus provides a useful 
measure to test the robustness of our estimates for the overall effects of entry from 
equation (3). Using this methodology, 13 of the 23 entrants were CABG focused.
After determining each entrant’s focus, we estimate the following model:
(4) surgshares, j, t = β0 + β1 CABGentrantshare_groupj, t
 + β2 highquals × CABGentrantshare_groupj, t
 + β3 newdocs × CABGentrantshare_groupj, t 
 + β4 PTCAentrantshare_groupj,t + β5 highquals 
 × PTCAentrantshare_groupj,t + β6 newdocs 
 × PTCAentrantshare_groupj, t + αt + Is, j + εs, j, t,
where CABGentrantshare_groupj,t and PTCAentrantshare_groupj,t are separate 
vectors of entrant share indicators—analogous to entrantshare_groupj,t in (3)—for 
CABG-focused and PTCA-focused entrants, respectively. Our theory suggests that 
CABG-focused entrants should be more likely than PTCA-focused entrants to view 
CABG surgeons as differentiated inputs. As such, our base results should be strongest 
among CABG-focused entrants, suggesting that we should expect β2 > 0 and β2 > β5.
Table 3 illustrates that the effect of entry by PTCA-focused hospitals has no dif-
ferential effect on the shares of surgeries held by high-quality or new surgeons (β5 
and β6, like β4, are small and statistically insignificant). This is true over the full 
range of definitions for high-quality surgeons. In contrast, entry by CABG-focused 
hospitals leads to a statistically significant reallocation of surgeries toward top sur-
geons. Initial entry (i.e., up to 10 percent of the market held by CABG-focused 
entrants) leads to an average increase of 2.7 percentage points in market share for 
high-quality surgeons relative to the average effect for standard-quality surgeons. 
These effects continue to be positive and significant with subsequent entry. Entry 
resulting in 10 to 20 percent market share for CABG-focused entrants results in a 
2 percentage point increase in share for high-quality relative to standard-quality 
surgeons. Entrant share in excess of 20 percent leads to a relative increase of 3.1 
percentage points for high-quality surgeons.25
25 We note, however, that we cannot reject the joint test for all entrant share groups that β2 = β5 ( p-value 
of 0.22). Despite this, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients for CABG- and PTCA-focused programs are 
 consistent with our general model and suggest that entry by CABG-focused firms is more likely to lead to 
increased demand for high-quality inputs than is entry by PTCA-focused firms.
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Table 3—Impact of Entrant Share on the Share of CABG Procedures Standard- and High-
Quality Surgeons Differentiated by Entering Hospital Focus (PTCA versus CABG)
Dependent variable: surgeon market share
High-quality High-quality High-quality High-quality
surgeon = top 
10 percent
surgeon = top 
20 percent
surgeon = top 
30 percent
surgeon = top 
40 percent
β1: CABG focused entrant share group
1–10 percent −0.009 −0.008 −0.008 −0.002(0.005)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
11–20 percent −0.011 −0.007 −0.007 0.000(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
20+ percent −0.008 −0.004 −0.004 0.003(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
β2: CABG focused entrant share group × high-quality surgeon
1–10 percent 0.027 0.013 0.012 0.003(0.011)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
11–20 percent 0.020 0.007 0.007 −0.004(0.011)* (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
20+ percent 0.031 0.009 0.008 0.000(0.015)** (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
β3: CABG focused entrant share group × new surgeon
1–10 percent 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.013(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)
11–20 percent 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.013(0.011)* (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
20+ percent 0.022 0.018 0.018 0.014(0.010)** (0.011)* (0.011) (0.010)
β4: PTCA focused entrant share group
1–10 percent −0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.001(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
11–20 percent −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
20+ percent −0.011 −0.011 −0.010 −0.016(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
β5: PTCA focused entrant share group × high-quality surgeon
1–10 percent 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.001(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
11–20 percent 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
20+ percent 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.021(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
β6: PTCA focused entrant share group × new surgeon
1–10 percent −0.005 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
11–20 percent −0.009 −0.009 −0.009 −0.008(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
20+ percent 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.027(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Year = 2002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002)*
Year = 2003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 3,836 3,836 3,836 3,836
R2 0.8664 0.8957 0.8957 0.8655
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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C. Changes in Quality from Volume-Outcome Effects
The redistribution of cases from standard- to high-quality surgeons may have 
a secondary effect on quality due to within-surgeon changes in volume that could 
induce changes in quality. This effect, commonly referred to as the volume-outcome 
relationship, is based on the premise that higher volume is associated with better sur-
gical outcomes (Luft, J. P. Bunker, and A. C. Enthoven 1979).26 Edward L. Hannan 
et al. (2003) estimate that in-hospital mortality rates were significantly lower for 
hospitals with between 200 and 800 surgeries annually and for surgeons perform-
ing more than 125 surgeries annually (see Shahian and Normand (2003); Eric D. 
Peterson et al. (2004); and Ethan A. Halm, Clara Lee, and Mark R. Chassin (2002) 
for additional discussion of appropriate volume thresholds). In this section, we use 
these cutoffs to distinguish high- and low-volume providers. Table 4 shows the share 
of hospitals and surgeons in our sample below recommended volume levels in differ-
ent years. In 1994, 23 percent of hospitals and 65 percent of surgeons failed to meet 
these levels. In 2000, a year with approximately the same total CABG volume as 
1994, these shares were higher for hospitals (27 percent) and lower for surgeons (60 
percent). By 2003, the share of patients seen by below-threshold providers increased 
with respect to both hospitals and surgeons.
We are interested not simply in the share of hospitals and surgeons working at an 
efficient scale, but also in whether entry affects the likelihood that a patient actually 
receives CABG from such a provider (i.e., one with annual volume above the thresh-
old level). To address this issue we estimate a model of the following form:
(5)  ln a​ highvoli,s,h,t  ___________  
1 − highvoli,s,h,t b​= β0 + β1 entrantsharej,t + β2 Zi + It + Ij + εi,s,h,t .
In (5), highvoli,s,h,t is an indicator equal to one if patient i received CABG from a 
high-volume surgeon, at a high-volume hospital, or from a high-volume surgeon-
hospital pair (depending on the specification). Entrantsharej,t is the share of volume 
in market j in quarter t going to hospitals that entered the market following the 
repeal of CON. Zi is a matrix of clinical and demographic characteristics for patient 
i similar to that included in (1). In addition, we include quarter and market fixed 
26 See David M. Shahian and Sharon-Lise T. Normand (2003) and Gaynor et al. (2005) for discussions of the 
literature on the volume-outcome relationship.
Table 4—Hospitals and Surgeon Operating Below Selected Volume Thresholds
  1994 1995 2000 2002 2003
Hospitals w/ annual volume < 200 10  7 15 27 29
Total hospitals 43 43 55 62 63
Share below threshold 23 percent 16 percent 27 percent 44 percent 46 percent
Surgeons w/ annual volume < 125 120 114 109 146 147
Total surgeons 184 189 182 188 182
Share below threshold 65 percent 60 percent 60 percent 78 percent 81 percent
Source: PHC4 CABG database.
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effects and cluster standard errors at the market level. Given the binary dependent 
variable, we estimate (5) as a conditional logit model.
Column 1 of Table 5 presents estimates of the likelihood that a patient sees a 
high-volume surgeon. We define a high-volume surgeon according to several differ-
ent thresholds for annual volume, going from 200 cases down to 75 cases per year. 
Column 2 repeats this analysis with respect to high-volume hospitals, again using 
multiple volume thresholds. Finally, column 3 presents results based on threshold 
volumes for surgeon-hospital pairings (i.e., the number of surgeries performed by 
a given surgeon at a specific hospital). This last specification is motivated by the 
potential for  firm-specific volume-outcome effects in cardiac surgery (Huckman and 
Gary P. Pisano 2006). For each volume threshold, we present the coefficient estimate 
Table 5—Impact of New Entrant Share on the Likelihood of Seeing an Above-Threshold Provider
Surgeon-hospital
Surgeon volume Hospital volume volume above
Dependent variable: above threshold? above threshold? threshold?
Threshold = 200 Threshold = 300 Threshold = 200
β1: Entrant share −0.002 −0.018 0.072(0.068) (0.022) (0.082)
Marginal effect 0.000 −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Threshold = 150 Threshold = 200 Threshold = 150
β1: Entrant share 0.013 −0.049 0.026(0.029) (0.025)** (0.029)
Marginal effect 0.002 −0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.002)** (0.004)
Threshold = 125 Threshold = 150 Threshold = 125
β1: Entrant share 0.031 −0.054 0.011(0.024) (0.023)** (0.025)
Marginal effect 0.008 −0.001 0.003
(0.006) (0.001)** (0.006)
Threshold = 100 Threshold = 100 Threshold = 100
β1: Entrant share 0.050 0.000 0.016(0.021)** (0.043) (0.015)
Marginal effect 0.011 0.000 0.004
(0.005)** (0.000) (0.004)
Threshold = 75 Threshold = 75 Threshold = 75
β1: Entrant share 0.000 −0.019 0.004(0.020) (0.060) (0.013)
Marginal effect 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Observations 37,708 37,708 37,708
Notes: Includes observations only for the years following the repeal of CON in Pennsylvania (i.e., 2000, 2002, and 
2003). The following variables are included in the regression but are not shown in the table: age, age2, calendar 
quarter fixed effects, market fixed effects, indicators for cardiogenic shock, concurrent angioplasty, complicated 
hypertension, dialysis, female gender, heart failure, and prior CABG or valve surgery. Standard errors (in paren-
theses) are clustered by market.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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for β1 in (5) as well as the marginal effect estimated at the patient-weighted-mean 
value of entrant share (19 percent).
The only statistically significant effects are found with respect to the likelihood 
that a patient is seen at a hospital performing in excess of 150 or 200 surgeries 
annually or that a patient is seen by a surgeon performing in excess of 100 surgeries 
annually. The hospital-level results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in 
entrant share is associated with roughly a 5 percentage point reduction in the prob-
ability of CABG occurring at a hospital performing more than 200 CABGs in that 
year, and a 1 percentage point reduction in the probability of CABG occurring at a 
hospital performing more than 150 procedures. These results, however, may reflect 
the fact that entrant hospitals are not operating at their equilibrium volumes shortly 
after entry. We also note that the same 10 percentage point increase in entrant share 
is associated with an 11 percentage point increase in the probability that CABG is 
provided by a surgeon performing at least 100 surgeries in that year. The estimates 
in Table 4 are sensitive to the choice of volume threshold. Given that fact, and the 
offsetting effects on physician and hospital volume, these results do not suggest a 
strong volume-related effect of entry on surgical quality.
D. Changes in Travel Distance
A final potential benefit of entry is reduced travel time for patients. Studies of con-
sumer choice in health care consistently find that distance or travel time are impor-
tant determinants of provider choice (Luft et al. 1990; Lawton R. Burns and Douglas 
R. Wholey 1992; Mark McClellan, Barbara J. McNeil, and Joseph P. Newhouse 
1994; Michael Chernew, Dennis Scanlon, and Rod Hayward 1998). Travel time in 
medical care is particularly important in emergency settings, as longer travel can 
increase the probability of mortality. A large portion of CABGs, however, are elec-
tive. In the aftermath of a heart attack, a patient will be stabilized, and medications 
or PTCA will be used to open the blocked artery. CABG might be performed later, 
either during the initial admission or a subsequent one. For CABG, the issue of travel 
time is less one of survival than of convenience.
We address the impact of entry on travel distance by estimating the following 
equation:
(6)   disti,s,h,t = β0 + β1 entrantsharej,t + β2 Zi + It + Ij + εi,s,h,t .
Disti,s,h,t is the distance (in miles) from the center of the patient’s zip code to the 
center of the hospital’s zip code.27 The estimate of β1 is −0.12 (standard error = 0.02), which suggests that, at the mean entrant share, the average CABG recipi-
ent traveled 2.3 fewer miles following entry. This represents a 9 percent reduction in 
travel distance relative to the patient-weighted average travel distance prior to entry 
of 27 miles. Nevertheless, for a one-time intervention lasting only a few days, such 
27 Perhaps the best measure of distance is how far relatives and caregivers have to travel. Unfortunately, this 
information is not available.
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as CABG, this decrease may not have a large effect on consumer welfare. We return 
to this issue in the next section.
IV.  The Welfare Impact of Free Entry
Our results allow for a rough calculation of the gains and losses from free entry 
associated with the repeal of Pennsylvania’s CON law. The cost of free entry is the 
fixed cost of the new programs. Estimates of the average fixed cost per new program 
vary between $12 and $14 million (Robinson et al. 2001; Huckman 2006), yielding 
a total social cost of between $120 million and $280 million for the 10-to-20 new 
CABG programs we attribute to CON repeal.28
As noted above, a key benefit of entry is the improvement in quality as surgeries 
are transferred from standard- to high-quality surgeons. To estimate the number of 
deaths averted, we rely on coefficient estimates reported in Table 2. The average 
entrant share was 13 percent in 2000 and 19 percent in 2003. We apply these entry 
shares to the coefficients in Table 2 to compute the additional share of surgeries done 
by high-quality surgeons following entry. Specifically, we compute the difference in 
average RAMR between the surgeons whose market share was increased (the top 10 
percent), those who saw no change in volume (those in the tenth-to-thirtieth percen-
tiles), and those who would have otherwise performed the surgery (the bottom 70 
percent of surgeons). Taking this change and scaling it by the average number of sur-
geries in Pennsylvania suggests that about 11 additional patients per year survived 
CABG because of the share redistribution following CON repeal.
The average Medicare beneficiary who survives bypass surgery lives another 
eight years. Assuming this applies to all CABG patients, the redistribution of vol-
ume across surgeons is associated with a statewide increase of 88 life years for each 
calendar year. Quality of life during those years, however, is not perfect. Tammy 
O. Tengs and Amy Wallace (2000) estimate that patients receiving CABG who are 
still alive 10 years later have a quality of life of 0.9 on a scale of death (0) to perfect 
health (1). Thus, the above figure translates into 79 additional quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs).29 The cost per QALY is therefore between $101,000 and $236,000.30 
Typical estimates of the value of a year of life in good health are between $100,000 
and $250,000 (Cutler 2004; Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel 2006), a figure 
that is roughly equal to our estimate of the cost per QALY.31 Thus, our estimates 
28 The lower bound is computed by comparing the number of new programs that entered in Pennsylvania in 
the five years between the repeal of CON and 2000 to the entry rate in New York and New Jersey (states that 
maintained CON) over the same period. During that period, an additional 12 programs entered in Pennsylvania 
compared to 3 in New York and 2 in New Jersey. We use the larger difference (10 programs) to ensure that our 
estimates are conservative. The upper bound assumes that all entry over our entire sample period (20 programs 
from 1995 to 2003) was due to the repeal of CON. 
29 A quality-adjusted life year (QALY) is a year of life in perfect health. We use the available QALY weight of 
0.9 (Tengs and Wallace 2000) for the patient population that most closely resembles that of interest in our study—
patients receiving CABG who are alive 10 years after surgery. 
30 The fixed costs of entry are amortized over the lifespan of a new CABG operating room. Discussions with 
hospital executives suggest 15 years is an appropriate length of time.
31 The reduction in travel time also improves welfare but only by a small amount. Scaling the average reduc-
tion in travel distance (2.3 miles) by an estimate for the number of visitors and the median wage in Pennsylvania 
suggests a value of roughly $7.50 per patient.
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suggest that gains from mortality reductions due to the redistribution of cases from 
standard- to high-quality surgeons approximately offset the fixed cost of free entry.
Our calculations involve several uncertainties. In addition to the issues noted 
above, we only account for quality improvements associated with in-hospital mor-
tality. Entry and redistribution of volume may yield gains in patient outcomes other 
than mortality (e.g., reduced morbidity). Our calculations also do not account for the 
reduced cost associated with eliminating the administrative infrastructure required 
to operate Pennsylvania’s CON program. Finally, our estimates are based on attrib-
uting all of the fixed costs associated with a new CABG program to CABG alone 
when, in all likelihood, some portion of these costs should be attributed to a hospital’s 
PTCA program (for which CABG represents a necessary backup) Given that all of 
these qualifications either lower the fixed costs attributable to CABG or increase the 
benefits of CABG entry, our cost-per-QALY estimates likely overestimate the true 
cost of CON repeal. With these caveats and given the range of welfare estimates, our 
results suggest, on net, that the repeal of CON was roughly welfare neutral.
V.  Conclusion
The well-known potential for free entry to be inefficient is realized when firms 
make entry decisions without internalizing the costs associated with the business 
they “steal” from incumbent firms. We show that input scarcity materially affects 
this conclusion. Theoretically, adding firms to a market with input scarcity is less 
likely to lead to excessive entry because entry is both inherently limited by fac-
tor supply and likely to increase demand differentially for high-quality factors of 
production.
In the setting we consider, the entry of CABG programs in Pennsylvania, this 
quality effect is apparent. Market share is distributed to higher-quality surgeons 
following entry, thereby improving the overall quality of surgical outcomes. The 
resulting welfare gains from entry are about equal to the losses from increased fixed 
costs, making free entry approximately welfare neutral.
Our setting is specific in at least three ways. First, the technology we consider 
is relatively mature. It is possible that the volume-outcome effects associated with 
transferring volume in settings with more nascent technologies, which are not toward 
the “flat” of the learning curve, might have different effects (either positive or nega-
tive) on welfare. In addition, we lack information on the impact of entry on price. 
While the lack of price information does not pose an obstacle for our analysis, due 
to the presence of a significant amount of administered pricing for CABG, changes 
in price may play a more meaningful role in welfare calculations in other settings. 
Finally, our study period coincides with the introduction of quality reporting for 
CABG in Pennsylvania (David Dranove et al. 2003). We do not feel that the  presence 
of these public reports should bias our findings, as reporting occurred simultaneously 
across the entire state while our empirical identification exploits the fact that differ-
ent markets experienced varying levels and timing of entry. If,  however, reporting 
facilitated the differentiation of inputs (e.g., without quality reporting high-quality 
surgeons could not be identified by hospitals), the effects of entry we observe may 
be more muted in markets with less information on quality.
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Even with these limitations, we suspect that the pattern underlying our results 
may be general. Many professions rely on highly and variably skilled individuals. 
Consider, for example, a new firm looking to enter investment banking. In addition 
to setting up a physical facility, the firm needs to hire or contract with specialized 
labor (i.e., investment bankers). In the short term, the supply of these factors is rela-
tively inelastic. Even in manufacturing, where the supply of production workers may 
be more elastic, industry-specific managerial talent may be specialized, and land of 
appropriate quality may be in fixed supply. As such, examining the welfare implica-
tions of entry in other markets represents a natural avenue for future research.
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